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Introduction
L AST FALL, delegates representing authors and composers fromall over the world attended the meeting of the Confederacion
Internationale des Societies d'Auteurs et Compositeurs (CISAC) in
Paris. It was an extraordinary week. It featured CISAC's 50th anni-
versary, the 125th anniversary of the French performing rights organi-
zation (the Societe des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique
(SACEM)), and the 200th anniversary of the Societe des Belles Lettres.
Sharing the spotlight during the week of meetings, deliberations and
festivities was the constant discussion among the delegates of the pro-
posed new copyright law in the United States.' It was particularly
appropriate that, at the concluding session of the Congress, an an-
nouncement was made to the assembled delegates that the United
States had at long last passed its Copyright Revision Act.2 However,
as the senior representative of the largest American performing rights
organization, I felt compelled to publicly express some misgivings.
The purpose of this commentary is to elaborate on those misgivings
1. The Copyright Act in effect at the time had been enacted by Congress in sub-
stantially its present form in 1909. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1970 & Supp.V 1975). For a
history of the attempted revisions of this Act, see H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 47 (1976).
2. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (to be
codified in 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.) [hereinafter cited as Copyright. Revision Act]. This
Act, however, with minor exceptions, does not become effective until January 1, 1978.
17 U.S.C. NOTE PREC. § 101.
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in the hope that we will not have to wait another 67 years before
needed changes are made."
Some Beneficial Results of the Revision
Certainly, the two changes in the United States copyright law which
should be applauded by everyone are the extension of term of copy-
right protection,4 and the elimination of the dual system of federal
and state copyright laws.!
Under prior law, copyright protection extended for twenty-eight
years, with a similar renewal term." The length of copyright is meas-
ured in the new law by the life of the author and fifty years.7 This
provision brings American law into conformity with the law in most
other countries." It is the provision that has deservedly received the
most publicity, especially among writers and publishers of music.o
An even more important change is the elimination of the dual
system of copyright protection. Under that system, there actually
existed fifty-one copyright laws: a federal statutory copyright, and
the common law copyright of each of the fifty states.'o The new law,
3. See generally Hochberger, Copyright Law: Shape of Things to Come, 21 N.Y.L.J.
1 (1977).
4. Copyright Revision Act §§ 302-05.
5. Id. § 301.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970 & Supp.V 1975).
7. Copyright Revision Act § 302.
8. In particular, it eliminates the major obstacle preventing the United States from
joining the Berne Convention. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, signed September 9, 1886, 12 DE IARTENS, NOVEAU RECUEIL CENERAL
DE TRAITES (2 ser.) 173, completed at Paris May 4, 1896, 24 DE IMARTENS, NOVEAU
RECUEIL GENERAL DE THAITES (2 ser.) 758, revised at Berlin November 13, 1908, 1
L.N.T.S. 217, completed at Berne March 20, 1914, 1 L.N.T.S. 243, revised at Rome
June 2, 1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 233, revised at Brussels June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217,
revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, -- U.N.T.S. -- , and revised at Paris July 24, 1971,
-- U.N.T.S. --. The Paris text of the Berne Convention entered into force on July
10, 1974, in accordance with Article 28. A copy may be found in 2 M. NIMMER, NIMER
ON COPYRIGHT, App. P, at 1033 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER]. For a discussion
of the protections afforded by the Berne Convention under prior law, see Nimmer,
Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States
Copyright Late, 19 STAN. L.R. 499 (1967). For a more general treatment, see 1 NIMMER,
§ 65.64, at 265 (1975). The United States is not a signatory of the Berne Convention.
9. Besides the obvious economic benefits to creators and their heirs that an increase
in the statutory period of monopoly confers, the new duration of the copyright term
eliminates the need for a renewal period, one of the most administratively burdensome
provisions under prior law, and allows those works which by their nature take longer
to make an impact on the public to bring long-awaited remuneration to their creators
before falling into the public domain. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.
134 (1976).
10. The system allowed each state to protect the rights of authors within its juris-
diction until publication. See 1 Nrsimen, supra note 8, §§ 46-49 at 183-196 (1975).
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for most purposes, is one federal statute which will preempt all state
copyright laws." Publication,12 which in most cases13 marked the
beginning of the copyright term, will no longer be the dividing line
between statutory federal copyright on the one hand, and state common
law copyright on the other hand.1 4
The extension of copyright to life and fifty years, and the estab-
lishment of a uniform United States copyright law, are major achieve-
ments which are all welcomed. Nevertheless, there are problems
elsewhere in the new law which are cause enough to subdue the
ovation.
The Compulsory License
In 1909, the public felt it necessary to establish a mechanism for
the compulsory licensing of musical compositions in order to prevent
a monopoly in the piano-roll industry by a small number of manu-
facturing companies.'; Under the statutory mechanism which Congress
11. Copyright Revision Act § 301. States may presently protect any rights that are
not within the categories listed in the Copyright Act. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973). Cf. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco. Corp.
v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (federal patent law preemptive). It
is interesting to note that the language of the Copyright Revision Act in its preemptive
provision, § 301, applies to state rights which are "equivalent" to the rights enumerated
in § 106 rather than those which are "in the nature" of such rights. See S. REP. No.
94-95, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 114-16. (1975).
12. "Investive publication" which secures federal copyright protection is a concept
apart from that in § 26 of the present Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp.V 1975),
which refers to publication as the earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition
are placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed. Such publication must be further dis-
tinguished from "divestive publication," which marks the end of state common law pro-
tection. The case law reaches inconsistent results when this concept is applied to the
exploitation of a work other than by the distribution of printed copies. Compare, Mc-
Intyre v. Double A Music Corp., 166 F.Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (general distribution
of records a publication of underlying arrangement) with Rosette v. Rainbow Record
Mfg. Corp., 354 F.Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (no publication since record not a
"copy" of underlying composition).
13. Plastic works, drawings, works of art, photographs, photoplays, motion pictures,
dramatic compositions, and lectures may be registered and deposited prior to publication.
17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970); Shilknet v. Musicraft Records, 131 F.2d 929 (2nd Cir. 1942),
cert. denied 319 U.S. 742 (1943).
14. The new law starts the term of copyright running at the creation of the work,
not publication. Copyright Revision Act § 310(a). The concept of publication, which
resulted in much litigation, see, e.g., Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221
F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1955), has, therefore, for the most part been eliminated.
15. At the turn of the century vigorous competition existed in the growing piano-roll
industry. It was alleged that some of the major manufacturers of player pianos, led by
the Aeolian Company in New York, were attempting to gain control of the business to
the detriment of the smaller manufacturers and inventors. The company originally tried
to use the patent laws to control the manufacture of the piano rolls, but this was found
to be impractical. It then turned to the copyright laws in order to acquire the exclusive
right to perform copyrighted sheet music on its player pianos. However, an early federal
case, Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 Fed. 584 (1888), held that the use of perforated
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enacted,"' once a copyright proprietor authorized a recording of his
or her work, anyone could thereafter record that work by obtain-
ing the statutorily prescribed compulsory license."1 At the time, this
procedure was recognized to be an exception to general copyright
principles,"' and it was to have been limited to those exceptional cir-
cumstances. Despite such a narrow historical justification, the new
copyright law expands and extends the concept of compulsory licens-
ing into questionable new areas.
Section 118 of the new law allows public broadcasters to claim
a compulsory license" for the use of certain music. The broadcasters
strips in an organette did not constitute a copy of the underlying sheet music in violation
of the copyright laws. Nonetheless, it was alleged that the Aeolian Company had still
acquired from most of the major publishing companies the exclusive rights to perform
their copyrighted music on its piano rolls in the hope that the holding in McTammany
would not be followed with respect to player-pianos. In 1908, however, the Supreme
Court decided the case of White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908), in which it held that a mechanical piano roll reproduction is not a "copy"
of the musical composition so reproduced and consequently the rights which may be
claimed by copyright did not extend to such reproductions. Copyright owners turned
to Congress for help.
In considering the precursor to the mechanical licensing provision, Congress was
faced with a difficult problem. If it legislatively reversed the result in White-Smith Music,
it was alleged that the Aeolian contracts would give the company a virtual monopoly
on the music used by player pianos, thus strangling the small manufacturers and inventors.
On the other hand, failure to grant copyright protection to such a lucrative market would
be a serious blow to authors and composers. Congress compromised with the mechanical
licensing provision, Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1, 64, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (cur-
rent version at 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970)), which allowed the copyright owner the right
to control only the first mechanical reproduction of his work. For a discussion of the
fears of the "Aeolian Octopus," see Hearings on S. 6330 & H.R. 19853 (The Copyright Act
of 1909), before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives
of the 59th Congress, Conjointly, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 96, 110, 202, (1908) (Statements
of G. Howlett Davis, Esq., John J. O'Connell, and Nathan Burkan, Esq.); see also
SHAEFFER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 331 (1932).
16. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1, 64, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (current version
at 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970)).
17. Under present law, after the copyright owner files an "intention to use" then
and only then must the user pay that statutory royalty of $.02 per copy. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e)
(1970). Although the wording of § 1(e) is unclear in this respect, it has been so in-
terpreted by the courts. Norbay Music, Inc. v. King Records, Inc., 290 F.2d 617 (2nd
Cir. 1961). To take advantage of the compulsory license provision, a notice of intention
to become a licensee thereunder must be served on the copyright proprietor. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1(e) (1970).
18. See note 15, supra & authorities cited therein.
19. This compulsory license for public broadcasters was introduced as an amendment
to S.1361 by Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., during the 93rd Congress. However, the
amendment was not actively considered with the understanding that the issue would be
fully studied by the 94th Congress. During 1975, the Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Committee instituted proceedings to which
they invited representatives of public broadcasters and copyright proprietors in the hopes
of reaching agreements outside the copyright legislation. The Subcommittee reported
that tentative conclusions on a number of issues had been reached in those negotiations.
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supported the demand for their own compulsory license2 0 upon the
undefined possibility that they might either undergo difficulties in
obtaining the rights to use music on their stations, or encounter ob-
stacles in securing synchronization rights to musical works. 2 1 But BMI
has dealt with all other classes of music users and none of them has
found any of the insurmountable problems that public broadcasters
insistqd exist for them.2 2 Moreover, negotiations held under the aus-
pices of the Senate Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice2 3 showed that there were no significant prob-
lems either in tl e obtaining of the rights to use music, or in the me-
chanics of payment to writers or publishers. What the compulsory
license for public broadcasters in fact may do is to deprive writers and
publishers of reasonable compensation for the use of their music and
afford those public broadcasters the luxury of avoiding negotiation. 2 4
However, in view of the unresolved problems, the Committee on the Judiciary of the
94th Congress incorporated a compulsory licensing provision similar to the one proposed
by Senator Mathias in S.22, although it still encouraged the parties to reach private
agreements. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1975).
20. The license only applies to published, non-dramatic musical works, and to pub-
lished pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. Copyright Revision Act § 118(b). In
general, the license only applies to broadcasts by nonprofit institutions, including public
agencies. Id. § 118(d). The license fee will usually be determined by negotiations be-
tween the parties in cooperation with the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Id. § 118(b).
However, the terms and the scope of the compulsory license may be changed by volun-
tary agreements negotiated between the parties. Id. § 118(b)(2).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 117 (1976).
22. In fact, while the compulsory licensing provision was under discussion in Cong-
ress, PBS offered to dispense with their lobbying efforts if the United States performing
rights societies would accept a $300,000 negotiated rate for two years. BMI, which would
have received about $90,000 a year from this sum, rejected the offer as far too little to
properly compensate its 50,000 affiliates for the use of their music on public television
stations, given BMI's administrative costs and its obligation to pay foreign performing
rights societies for music used on foreign-based PBS shows, such as "Monty Python's
Flying Circus" and "Upstairs, Downstairs." See Hearings on H.R. 2223 (The Copyright
Revision Act of 1976), before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee of the 94th Congress, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 970-72 (1975) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. If PBS were will-
ing to drop its demand for a compulsory license, which was allegedly based on its fears
about obtaining musical rights, in return for the acceptance by the performing rights
societies of its monetary offer, then one can only conclude that the "potential horrors"
that formed the basis for the PBS compulsory license were founded more in money than
in red tape.
23. These negotiations were requested to be held by the Senate Copyright Subcom-
mittee by personal solicitation from Senator McClellan and Counsel Thomas Brennan
to BMI and other copyright owner representatives.
24. The Revision Act does require copyright owners and public broadcasters to
negotiate in good faith in cooperation with the Copyright Royalty Tribunal in order to
reach agreement on reasonable royalty rates. Copyright Revision Act § 118(b). More-
over, any agreements voluntarily negotiated between copyright owners and public broad-
casters will be given effect in lieu of any determination by the Tribunal. Id. § 118(b) (2).
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Congress also extended the copyright owner's right to receive
compensation for the use of his work into two other areas. Cable
television stations, for the first time,2 will be required to pay a fee
when they retransmit works originally broadcast by radio and tele-
vision.2 6 Jukeboxes, which previously enjoyed a statutory exemption,2 7
will now be required to obtain licenses for the music that they play.2"
However, both of these new rights are subject to the expanded com-
pulsory licensing provision.29
However, past experience with public broadcasters demonstrates that such voluntary
negotiations, if they occur at all, will ultimately be fruitless. It is feared that writers and
publishers, will, in the end, receive their share of any performance royalties according
to the Tribunal's rate, which, given the nature of any such arbitration body, and the
diminishing returns caused by the Tribunal's administrative costs, will not begin to
approach the reasonable compensation which fair negotiations would produce. For an
extended discussion of the public broadcasting licensing process, see House Hearings,
supra note 22, at 857-990.
25. Copyright Revision Act § 111. Under prior law, CATV was not required to pay
performance royalties due to the Supreme Court's decisions in Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc. 392 U.S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). See generally NiIMER, supra note 8, §
107.44, at 414.1-414.10 (1975); see also note 50 & accompanying text, infra.
26. At least, this is the result that the law is supposed to reach. Unfortunately, §
111(b) of the Revision Act is a prime example of the incomprehensibility of important
statutory language. Many copyright lawyers can explain what it is supposed to accom-
plish, but I have yet to meet one who can read the section and understand its language.
It is reprinted here in its entirety for scholarly dissection:
§ 111. Limitations on exclusive rights: Secondary Transmissions.
(a) . . .
(b) Secondary Transmission of Primary Transmission to Controlled
Group. - Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and
(c), the secondary transmission to the public of a primary trans-
mission embodying a performance or display of a work is action-
able as an act of infringement under section 501, and is fully
subject to the remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and
509, if the primary transmission is not made for reception by the
public at large but is controlled and limited to reception by particu-
lar members of the public: Provided, however, that such secondary
transmission is not actionable as an act of infringement if-
(1) the primary transmission is made by a broadcast station
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission; and
(2) the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary trans-
mission is required under the rules, regulations, or authori-
zations of the Federal Communications Commission;
and
(3) the signal of the primary transmitter is not altered or
changed in any way by the secondary transmitter.
The foregoing is not the only instance in the Revision Act where the draftsmen seemed
to have sacrificed clarity for quick enactment.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
28. Copyright Revision Act § 116.
29. Copyright Revision Act § 115. The license only applies in the case of non-
dramatic musical works.
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The extension of compulsory licensing is an erosion of the rights
of the copyright owner. From a limited exception in 1909, compulsory
licensing has grown to become a major factor in our copyright law.
Even such champions of the Copyright Revision Act as Barbara Ringer,
the Registrar of Copyrights, conceded that the expansion of compul-
sory licensing was not a desirable change."o Unfortunately, I can only
see that concept creeping into other areas with the result of further
diminishing what should be left to the copyright owners to decide for
themselves.
The Fixed Rate
Closely related to the problem of compulsory licensing of previously
recorded musical works is the concept of a fixed statutory rate for that
license, which is contained in the mechanical licensing provision.31
Unfortunately, for the past sixty-nine years, through both depression
and inflation, this fee has remained unchanged. Although the new law
does change the fee, '2 it still perpetuates the static concept of fixed
rates. However, the new law goes beyond the old by extending the
concept of a statutory rate to jukeboxes as well, at the rate of $8.00 for
each jukebox per year. 3 The statute also fixes the fees to be paid by
cable television operators, basing those fees on the percentages of
their gross receipts.3 4
The concept of a fixed statutory fee for a compulsory license is not
only antagonistic to the rights of the copyright owner,35 but the like-
lihood is that with the passage of time the concept will be expanded,
and probably unjustifiably, to cover new areas.
The Copyright Office
Another significant change, which also was added to the new law
without a great deal of discussion, was the expansion of the role of the
Copyright Office. Under the present law, the Copyright Office merely
30. See House Hearings, supra note 22, at 976-77.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970). The section provides that one may obtain a compulsory
license for musical compositions which have been previously recorded by the copyright
owner by giving notice of intention to become a licensee thereunder and by paying the
statutory rate of $.02 for each record manufactured.
32. Copyright Revision Act § 115. The rate has been increased to the larger of
$.0275 per recording or $0.005 per minute of playing time, and it applies to each record
made and distributed, rather than manufactured. Id. § 115(c)(2).
33. Copyright Revision Act § 116. The rate is subject to review and further revision
by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Id. § 801(b).
34. Copyright Revision Act § 111(d)(2)(B).
35. See S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1975).
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performs ministerial functions, such as recording assignments of copy-
right,36 preparing copyright certificates"7 and maintaining a catalogue
of copyrighted material.3
Under the new law, however, the Copyright Office has been given
responsibilities far beyond anything it has ever undertaken previously.
For example, the Office will now send to Congress a judgmental report
on whether the Revision Act's library reproduction provisions have
forged a fair balance between creators and' users.3 9 It will suggest
methods for affixing a copyright notice that will comply with the law.40
And it will make threshold administrative determinations of whether
a work contains uncopyrightable subject matter or whether a copy-
right claim is invalid." This expansion of the Office's role has raised
questions of whether the new law is constitutionally sound.4 2 In fact,
the Department of justice sent an eleventh hour memorandum to
President Ford urging that he veto the Revision Act because it violated
the constitutional requirement of separation of powers by, among other
things, housing the newly formed Copyright Royalty Tribunal in the
Library of Congress and providing it with Copyright Office staff.43
Without commenting on this constitutional question, I certainly
feel that a good deal can be said as a practical matter in opposition to
the expanded role of the Copyright Office. For implicit in this expan-
sion is a threat to the underlying interests of copyright owners. If
questions on the validity of the administration of copyrights arise, they
should be answered squarely by the courts, and not by the direct or
indirect influence of the Copyright Office.
The New Technology
Leaving aside these general observations, I would like to turn now
to some more specific problems with the new law. It was argued that
a new copyright law was long overdue because the old law had failed
36. 17 U.S.C. § 30 (1970). This practice has been continued under the new law.
Copyright Revision Act § 706.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 31 (1970). The practice has been continued under the new law.
Copyright Revision Act § 701.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1970); 37 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1973). This practice has been con-
tinued under the new law. Copyright Revision Act § 704.
39. Copyright Revision Act § 108(i).
40. Id. § 401(c).
41. Id. § 410(a).
42. See Brylawski, The Copyright Office: A Constitutional Confrontation, 44 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1975).
43. See VARIETY, Oct. 27, 1976, at 93; also RECORD WORLD, Jan. 15, 1977, at 45.
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to take into account and was not equipped to handle recent techno-
logical changes, such as computer software, reprography, and satellite
broadcasting, to name just a few. In fact, the reports of both the Senate
and House Judiciary Committees contain language suggesting that this
new technology was a major impetus behind the Copyright Revision
Act. The very first paragraph of the Senate report on the Act states
that "many significant developments in technology and communica-
tions have rendered (the present Copyright Law) clearly inadequate
to the needs of the country today."4 The House report expands this
idea further:
. . . Motion pictures and sound recordings had just made their ap-
pearance in 1909, and radio and television were still in the early
stages of their development. During the past half-century a wide
range of new techniques for capturing and communicating printed
matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use, and
the increasing use of information storage and retrieval devices, com-
munications satellites, and laser technology promises even greater
changes in the near future. The technical advances have generated
new industries and new methods for the reproduction and dissem-
ination of copyrighted works, and the business relations between
authors and users have evolved new patterns.45
Yet, despite these justifiable and important concerns, when one
actually looks at the long history of the new copyright law to see
precisely how it handles them, it appears that Congress only decided
to create the National Commission on New Technological Uses and
Works (CONTU) in 1974.40 This Commission must report to the
President and Congress recommendations for future changes in the
Copyright Act which will keep them abreast of the developments in
technology.47 The Commission rendered its preliminary report on
October 8, 1976; it is required to submit another by December 31,
1977.41 The Commission is also authorized to submit as many interim
reports as it deems necessary,4 9 although to my knowledge no such
reports have been issued. BMI is the largest performing rights organi-
zation in the world, with over 30 thousand writers and 15 thousand
publishers. In addition, it administers hundreds of thousands of works
from abroad. It is the leader in establishing new technologies to handle
44. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1975).
45. H. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 47 (1976).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)(Supp.V 1975).
47. Id. § 201(c).
48. Id. § 206(a)&(b).
49. Id. § 206(c).
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the mass volume of copyright usages. Other countries have come to
look upon our system as a model for their own. Yet, CONTU made
no inquiry into our operation, and it was only at BMI's request that
CONTU staff members visited our headquarters on March 11, 1977,
and later granted BMI an appearance before it on March 31, 1977, to
demonstrate how we function. So, with all the time that was available
to draft the Copyright Revision Act, the final version still did not ac-
complish its stated objective of preparing for the technology of today,
let alone the technology of tomorrow.
What Ever Happened to George Aiken?
When faced with a difficult problem, it appears that the draftsmen
of the new law preferred to avoid its resolution. I refer specifically
to the situation created by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in 20th Century Music Co. v. Aiken."0 In that case, the Court
was confronted with an infringement action against a restaurant owner
who furnished music to his customers during business hours by tuning
in his radio, augmented by four loudspeakers, to a local broadcast
station. The local broadcaster was licensed to broadcast the music, but
the restaurant owner was not. Nonetheless, the Court held that there
was no infringement since the restaurant owner was not "performing"
the music, but merely "receiving" it.;' The Court based its decision
on the functional analysis that it had developed earlier in the Cable
Television Cases:5 2 "Broadcasters perform; viewers do not perform."5"
The decision in Aiken runs contrary to the one in its famous prede-
cessor, Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.5 4 In Jewell-LaSalle, the Court
was presented with the certified question:
Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his guests,
through the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and loud-
speakers installed in his hotel and under his control for the enter-
tainment of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical compo-
sition which has been broadcast from a radio transmitting station,
constitute a performance of such composition within the meaning
of (the Copyright Act) ?"
To this question the Court answered "Yes." It is difficult to reconcile
50. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
51. Id. at 162.
52. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Tele-
prompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
53. 20th Century Music Co. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 161 (1975).
54. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
55. Id. at 191.
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Jewell-LaSalle, which holds that a hotel proprietor who makes broad-
cast music available to his guests through loudspeakers is "performing"
the music, with Aiken, which holds that a restaurant owner who pro-
vides the same service is not. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did
not expressly overrule Jewell-LaSalle." Mr. Justice Blackmun, in a
concurring opinion in Aiken, expressed his discomfort with the de-
cision, noting that ". . . the Court dances around Jewell-LaSalle, as
indeed it must, for it is potent opposing precedent for the present case
and stands stalwart against respondent Aiken's position. I think that
we should be realistic and forthright and if Jewell-LaSalle is in the
way, overrule it."57
Justice Blackmun also pointed out the need for Congressional action
to clarify the result of the Court's decision in Aiken:
Resolution of these difficult problems and the fashioning of a more
modern statute are to be expected from the Congress. In any event,
for now, the Court seems content to continue with its simplistic
approach and to accompany it with a pragmatic reliance on the
'practical unenforceability' . . . of the copyright law against such
persons as George Aiken.68
Similar sentiments were also voiced by the dissent.50
But despite this advice, when it came time for the draftsmen
actually to resolve the problem, it appears that they decided to avoid
it instead. Section 110(5) of the Revision Act, which supposedly deals
with the Aiken situation, reads as follows:
9 110. Limitations on exclusive rights: Exemption of certain per-
formances and displays.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are
not infringements of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance
or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on
a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes, unless -
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is transmitted to the public.60
56. Twentieth Century Music Co. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160 (1975).
57. 422 U.S. at 167 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 166.
59. Id. at 167. (Burger, C. J., with whom Douglas, J., joins, dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger began his dissent by stating: "My primary purpose in writing is not
merely to express disagreement with the Court but to underscore what has repeatedly
been stated by others as to the need for legislative action."
60. Copyright Revision Act § 110(5).
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When they asked whether this section would change the result in
Aiken, reporters received different answers from the counsel for the
Senate Subcommittee, the counsel for the House Subcommittee, and
the Registrar of Copyrights, all certainly distinguished authorities on
the subject.6 '
Section 101 of the Revision Act, the definitional section, states that
"(t)o 'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the
place from which they are sent."62 Arguably, playing broadcast music
over the type of inter-room loudspeaker system which the Court ad-
dressed in Jewell-LaSalle (or for that matter, Aiken,) would constitute
a further transmission of the music to the public, and so fall within
§ 110(5) (B).", However, in the Conference Report of September
19, 1976, which accompanied the final version of the Revision Act,
the Conference Committee stated:
With respect to section 110(5), the conference substitute conforms
to the language in the Senate bill. It is the intent of the conferees
that a small commercial establishment of the type involved in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, . . . which merely aug-
mented a home-type receiver and which was not of sufficient size
to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial back-
ground music service, would be exempt. However, where the public
communication was by means of something other than a home-type
receiving apparatus, or where the establishment actually makes a
further transmission to the public, the exemption would not apply.64
If ever language invited ligitation, the foregoing is it. What is a "small
commercial establishment?" Who can define a "home-type" receiver?
Is a "practical matter" determined on anything other than a completely
subjective basis?
Thus, section 110(5) of the new Copyright Act apparently leaves
us with the same unpalatable result as existed under Aiken, trying to
determine "as a practical matter" whether the device in question is
merely an "augmented home-type receiver" which only "receives"
61. Mr. Thomas Brennan, the counsel for the Senate Subcommittee of the Judiciary
of the 93rd Congress, said that "the George Aikens of this world would be liable" under
the provisions of the Revision Act. RECORD WORLD, July 5, 1975, at 3. Ms. Barbara
Ringer, the Registrar of Copyrights, was quoted as saying: "My feeling is that (Aiken)
would not be liable, although this case does fall into an unclear area." Id. The counsel
for the House Subcommittee of the Judiciary of the 93rd Congress, Mr. Herbert Fuchs,
made probably the most honest remark of all when he admitted that: "I just don't
know." Id.
62. Copyright Revision Act § 101.
63. See H. R. REP. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 86-88 (1976).
64. H. R. CON. REP. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 75 (1976).
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broadcast music, or whether it is somehow "something else" which
actually transmits to the public and so "performs" the music. And Mr.
Justice Blackmun's suggestion 5 to Congress to clarify the copyright
liability with respect to music emanating from a loudspeaker seems,
in the final result, to have fallen on deaf ears.
The Not-So-Constructive Notice
Section 401 of the Revision Act requires that whenever a work is
protected under the copyright law, "in the United States or elsewhere,"
a notice shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies." The notice
consists of a @, the word "copyright," or the abbreviation "copr."; the
year of the first publication of the work; and the name of the copy-
right owner. 7 Accepting the fact that some notice is desirable,"s then
why is it necessary to include the date? In fact, the Revision Act
provides that the date may be omitted when a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work is reproduced on greeting cards, stationery, jewelry,
toys, or any useful article.6"1 If the date is not required in these
instances, why should it be required in the case of music?
The purpose of the date is supposedly to advise the public when
the work was first published so as to compute when the work will
enter the public domain. But under the new law, the date of publi-
cation is almost irrelevant, since the term of copyright is measured by
the life of the author plus fifty years.70 Even in the case of pseudonyms
and works for hire, where the term is seventy-five years from the year
of first publication, there exists an alternative term: one hundred years
from the year of creation, whichever expires first.7 ' Therefore, even in
those cases the date of publication is not necessarily the determining
factor of when the work will be available to the general public.
65. See note 57 & accompanying text, supra.
66. Copyright Revision Act § 401(a).
67. Id. § 401(b).
68. Besides the obvious reason of informing a potential user of the existence of copy-
right protection, the type of notice described in the text is a prerequisite to protection
under the Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.), signed at Geneva September 6,
1952, entered into force July 10, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. 7868, -- U.N.T.S. -.
A copy of the Paris text may be found in 2 NIMIMER, supra note 8, App. Q, at 1072
(1975). See also BocscH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL CONVENTION,
at 26 (1968). However, since it was the United States which insisted that the Conven-
tion include the notice provision, it would be circular to argue that the only reason for
including the provision in the new law was to comply with the U.C.C.
69. Copyright Revision Act § 401(b) (2).
70. Id. § 302(a).
71. Id. § 302(c).
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Furthermore, the effect of an omission of notice from a work no
longer automatically results in the loss of copyright, as was often the
case under prior law.12 Under the new law, if, for example, within five
years of publication without notice, a work has been registered and
thereafter a "reasonable effort" has been made to add appropriate
notice of copyright, the copyright is not invalidated.7" Moreover, sec-
tion 406 liberalizes the rules when there are errors in the names or
dates of notice.74
Considering the longer duration of the term of copyright,75 and the
right of the author to recapture protection for his work,," there may
well be a great number of assignments made after the work is originally
published. Nothing is said in the Revision Act as to the notice require-
ments in the event of an assignment.7 It is hard to see how the original
copyright notice can be of any value when the first copyright owner
has assigned the work and there have been several intermediate
assignments.
In view of the changes governing the duration of copyright and the
liberalization of the statutory remedies in the event that notice of
copyright is omitted from the work, it seems clear that the preferable
approach would have been to eliminate the notice requirement al-
together, or at least modify it so that the date would no longer be
required as part of the copyright notice.
Economic Impact
What does the new copyright law mean in terms of dollars and
cents for the average composer and publisher of music? Certainly, the
extension of the term of copyright protection78 is significant for them.
And an equally meaningful economic advance is provided by the in-
crease in the mechanical royalty rate from $0.02 per record manu-
factured to $0.0275 per record manufactured or $0.005 per minute,
72. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 82, at 302 (1975).
73. Copyright Revision Act § 405(a).
74. Id. § 406.
75. Id. § 302. See note 7 & accompanying text, supra.
76. Copyright Revision Act § 405.
77. Present law allows for the assignment of copyrights by an instrument in writing.
17 U.S.C. § 28 (1970). However, such assignments must be recorded with the Copy-
right Office within a specified period or risk being held void as against a subsequent
purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice whose assignment has been duly
recorded. 17 U.S.C. § 30 (1970). For a general discussion of assignments and other
transfers of copyright, see 2 NIMMER, supra note 8, §§ 119-130, at 509-565 (1975).
78. Copyright Revision Act § 302(a).
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whichever is greater.7 9 But there the advance falters. Most of the other
changes in the law will result in only the most insignificant increase
in the income of the average music writer or publisher, at least for
the foreseeable future. Writers and publishers should be aware, there-
fore, that the new law is not the bonanza that wishful thinkers believe
it to be.
Three aspects of the new law underscore the fact of its limited
economic impact.
1. Jukeboxes, which long enjoyed a statutory exemption from
performing rights fees,so are now required to pay.8' The requirement
reminds me of a scene from Neil Simon's play, The Prisoner of Second
Avenue. 2 In that scene, members of a family gather together and each
agrees to contribute "x" to assist an ailing brother until someone asks,
"How much is 'x'?" In the case of jukeboxes, "x" is only $8.00 per
jukebox per year, and this sum is to be divided among all those whose
music is used on the jukeboxes."3 In other words, the jukebox royalty
will be divided among all the members of the three major United
States performing rights societies, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP),
and SESAC, Inc., as well as among those writers and publishers not
affiliated with any licensing society. It is estimated that the total
amount collected from the jukeboxes will not exceed $4 million a
year,84 and this is before deducting the expenses of collection and
distribution. Thus, the net gain to all American music writers and
publishers, whose numbers will likely exceed fifty thousand, plus the
tens of thousands of foreign composers and publishers, should be no
more than $3 million a year.
2. Statutory liability is now imposed on the cable television in-
dustry for the retransmission of copyrighted material which originated
on broadcast television. 5 This major change should result in additional
income to copyright owners. However, the Congressional Committee
estimated that the total revenues from the cable industry during the
79. Id. § 114. See note 32 & accompanying text, supra.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970). See note 27 & accompanying text, supra.
81. Copyright Revision Act § 116. See note 28 & accompanying text, supra.
82. N. SIMON, THE PRISONER OF SECOND AVENUE (Avon Books, New York, 1973).
83. Copyright Revision Act § 116.
84. This is computed on the basis of a statutory rate of $8.00 per year on 500,000
jukeboxes in use.
85. Copyright Revision Act § 111. See note 19 & accompanying text, supra.
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first few years would be in the neighborhood of $8.7 million a year.86
This figure is for all copyrighted material used on cable, including
films, specially-packaged television shows, news, sports events and
music. There is no exact indication of what music's share will be, but
initially it will not exceed $2 million a year. And this figure, too, is
before overhead and expenses.
3. Under the new law, royalty fees may now be collected for the
performance of a musical composition under non-commercial auspices,
which includes public broadcasting.,' Prior law limited such collections
only to public performances of a musical composition "for profit."88
However, the earlier law distinguished between music and drama,
giving a copyright owner of the latter the exclusive right to perform
the work publicly, regardless of whether or not "for profit.""1 Thus,
for example, if a public broadcaster wanted to present a copyrighted
dramatic work, permission of the copyright owner was required. But
when the public broadcaster performed a piece of protected music,
no such clearance was necessary. This glaring inequity has been cor-
rected,90 at least in part. Under the new law, the copyright owner has
the exclusive right to perform his musical work publicly, whether or not
"for profit.""' However, public broadcasters may still take advantage
of a compulsory license for the use of the copyrighted music,9 2 a benefit
which they do not have in the case of other protected works, such
as dramas and motion pictures.!" The gross income from these non-
profit performances of published nondramatic musical works cannot be
estimated with accuracy; but the figure will not be great. Non-com-
mercial users cannot be expected to pay the same rates as commercial
operations.94
Despite some significant changes, it seems clear that the new law
will not result in substantial economic benefits for the majority of com-
posers and music publishers. It is not likely that the changes in the
Copyright Act will bring about more than a five per cent increase in
total performing rights income.
86. H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 91 (1976).
87. Copyright Revision Act § 111.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1970).
90. See H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 62-63 (1976).
91. Copyright Revision Act § 106(4).
92. Copyright Revision Act § 118. See note 19 & accompanying text, supra.
93. Id.
94. See note 22 & accompanying text, supra.
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Conclusion
Congressman Edward W. Pattison, a member of the House Copy-
right Subcommittee who played an instrumental role in securing the
passage of the new Copyright Act, observed:
There remain unanswered and unaddressed issues. No doubt de-
fects will be discovered in this legislation as it becomes operative.
I hope the Subcommittee (of the Judiciary) will address itself to
these matters in the next and succeeding sessions of the Congress
so that a major revision such as this one will never again be
necessary.9 5
It is indisputable that, in the main, the Copyright. Revision Act of
1976 has long been overdue and that its enactment is welcomed by all
concerned. In any major piece of legislation, and certainly in any one
which has been in the making for over twenty years, there will be
areas which will be touched upon too lightly, areas which will be
written too expansively, and areas which will be neglected altogether.
But one has the right to expect that once Congress undertakes such
a monumental task as the wholesale revision of an entire body of law
it will carefully analyze the priorities, potential abuses, and ultimate
long-range effects of each provision before it gives any new provision
its imprimatur. Unfortunately, too often in the Copyright Revision
Act of 1976 Congress failed to take into account those things which
would have made their revision of the law balanced between the
creators and users of copyrighted works. Equally to blame of course
were the representatives of the creators and users themselves, who
were concerned almost exclusively with their special interests and so
failed to take an objective look at the Revision Act in its entirety.
Now that the smoke has settled and we have a new Copyright Act,
perhaps all interested parties can examine it more impartially and
make those corrections which will bring the law into conformity with
all of our objectives. Then we can have a copyright law that is fair
to both creators and users while at the same time being administratively
manageable.
95. 122 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD E5244 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Pattison).
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